

1.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from all of the evidence in this case that the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, was driving her automobile in a reasonably careful and prudent manner at the time of the accident, then your verdict should be for such Defendant.

*Refused*  
*Jeffrey M. Mathison*  
*Judge*

2.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case that at the time of the accident the defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, was driving her automobile in a careful and prudent manner and in a manner in which a reasonably prudent person would have driven their automobile under the same or similar circumstances, then your verdict should be for such Defendant.

*Given*  
*Jeffrey M. Mathison*  
*Judge*

3.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that the driver of an automobile desiring to make a left hand turn between intersections should exercise extra precaution before attempting the left turn in order to see that such turn may be made in safety.

~~Refused~~  
J. J. Moulton  
Judge

4.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from all of the evidence in this case that the Defendant, Lester Powell, had a clear and uninterrupted view in the direction from which the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, was coming and if you are further reasonably satisfied from all of the evidence in the case that the Defendant, Powell, looked in the direction from which the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, was coming prior to making his left turn, then the Defendant, Lester Powell, will be deemed to have seen the approach of the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, for a distance within the scope of the Defendant, Powell's, vision in said direction.

J. J. Moulton  
Judge

5.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that before the Plaintiff will be entitled to recover from the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop, for any damages or injuries suffered in the accident complained of for negligence based on a violation of a statute or ordinance with reference to speed, then you must be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that such Defendant was guilty of conduct which amounted to a violation of such ordinance and that such conduct proximately caused the accident and injuries complained of by the Plaintiff.

*Given*  
*Seaman J. MacLellan*  
*Judge*

6.

I charge you gentlemen of the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the speed at which the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop's, automobile was being operated on the occasion complained of was the speed at which a reasonably prudent person would have operated the automobile under the same or similar circumstances, then you can not find that the Defendant was traveling at an unlawful speed on said occasion.

*Given*  
*Seaman J. MacLellan*  
*Judge*

8.

I charge you members of the jury that Title 36, Section 17 of the Code of Alabama is a "rule of the road" which says that "no person shall . . . . turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety." If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the Defendant, Lester Powell, violated this rule of the road and that such violation was the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries then you should find for the Defendant, Elizabeth Bishop.

~~Refused~~  
Jeffrey G. Maslowski  
Judge

9.

I charge you members of the jury that no municipal body by local ordinance shall have the power to pass, enforce or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation regulating motor vehicles or their speed contrary to the provisions of the State law of Alabama and I further charge you that the prima facie lawful speed of a passenger vehicle in the State of Alabama during the hours one-half before sunrise until one-half hour after sunset shall be sixty miles per hour and regardless of the posted speed limit in the area where this accident occurred if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that Elizabeth Bishop was operating her vehicle at a speed of sixty miles per hour or less at the time and place the accident occurred then she is not guilty of negligence because of the speed of her vehicle unless you are also further satisfied from the evidence that the speed at which she operated her vehicle at such time and place was greater than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and of any other conditions then existing.

~~Refused~~  
Jeffrey G. Maslowski  
Judge